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ELLIS I. ANDERSON and EvA .ANDERSON,
his wife, BERT CENTER and JANE
DoE CENTER, whose true name is
unknown, his wife, ALLIANCE REALTY & BuiLDING Co., a corporation,
also ,all other persons unknown
claiming any right, title, estate or
interest in or lien upon the real
propertyllescribed in the complaint
adverse to plaintiff's ownership or
clouding plaintiff's title, thereto,

Case No. 7638

Defendants and Respondents.
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OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
RENNOLD PENDER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
ELLis I. .._~DERSON and EvA ANDERSON,
his wife, BERT CENTER and JANE
DoE CENTER, whose true name is
unknown, his wife, ALLIANCE REALTY & BuiLDING Co., a corporation,
also all other persons unknown
claiming any right, title, estate or
interest in or lien upon the real
property described in the complaint
adverse to plaintiff's ownership or
clouding plaintiff's title, thereto,
Defenda;nts and Respondents.

Case No. 7638

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This was an action to quiet the title to certain Salt
Lake County realty, brought by plaintiff ·and appellant,
Rennold Pender (Rec. 1-3), as assignee of Dr. G. MurSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ray Edwards (Rec. 34, 87-88, Ex. "A"), to rescind as
fraudulent a deed to defendant and respondent Bert
Center, and to set aside a tax title acquired by defendant
and respondent Alliance Realty and Building Company
(Rec. 31-32, Ex. "A", Entries 5, 9, 11), as being based
on an invalid tax sale ( Rec. 44-45, 77).
It appeared that Dr. G. Murray Edwards, a resident
of Denver, Colorado, acquired title to Lots 11, 12, 13,
Block 1, Davis, Sharp & Stringers Addition to Salt Lake
City, Salt Lake County, Utah, by deed dated February
17, 1915, recorded February 23, 1917 (Rec. 31, 86, Ex.
"A", Entry 1). ~fr. Edwards was a physician, and had
as a patient over the period of the years 1929-1935, one
Bert Center (Rec. 86, 95 ), with whom he became very
friendly (Rec. 100-101). Dr. Edwards, being desirous
of disposing of the above lots, mentioned the matter to
Mr. Center, who was planning on going west, and who offered to try to make a sale or disposition of them for the
doctor (Rec. 86), and obtained from the latter a deed to
enable him to deal with the ground, said deed being dated
June 10, 1935, and recorded by Mr. Center June 14,
1935 (Rec. 86, 96-97, Ex. "A", Entry 6; Ex. 5). According to Dr. Edwards, the deed was executed to enable Mr. Center to make a sale or disposition of the lots,
and not otherwise, and upon ~any sale, Mr. Center was to
remit the proceeds, and receive a commission (Rec. 8788), and Dr. Edwards, relying upon the representations
of Mr. Center would not have executed or delivered the
instrument in question except upon the premises that
the ground was to be sold and that he was to receive the
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proceeds. X o n10ney or other fonn of consideration was
paid or giYen for the deed (Rec. 87) and Bert Center,
himself, adn1its (Rec. 100), there was no contemporaneous transfer or payment of cash or other consideration giYen for the deed at the time of the delivery of same
to him, but, contrary to the doctor's testimony, claiins
that the deed was given to him as compensation for services previously rendered gratuitously for Dr. Edwards
in looking up the status of some oil leases or oil stock
in Tex<as, which services were performed with no thought
of charging therefor at the time they were accomplished.
Taxes were not paid by either the doctor or Mr. Center,
and the lots in question were sold to Salt Lake County
for delinquent taxes on a four year s·ale under date of
~larch 18th, 1936 (Rec. 32, Ex. "A", Entry 7), and
thereafter. defendant-respondent Ellis I. Anderson acquired the tax title from Salt Lake County under date
of April lOth, 1946 (Entry 9, Exhibit "A", Rec. 32),
and later, joined by his wife, the defendant-respondent,
Eva P. Anderson, conveyed this tax title to defendant-respondent Alliance Realty and Building Company, on
August 6, 1947 (Rec. 33, Exhibit "A", Entry No. 11).
Dr. Edwards, joined by his wife Nella Edwards, deeded
his interest in the ground to Rennold Pender, (Rec. 32,
Exhibit "A", Entry 8), and executed an assignment of
his cause of action to rescind against Bert Center to
plaintiff-~appellant Pender (Rec. 34, 88, Ex. "A", last
entry). Thereupon this action was commenced (Rec.
1-3), and proceedings entering default of Bert Center and
the Andersons were had (Rec. 21-22). Later, Dr. EdSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ward's deposition was taken, when the attorney for Alliance Realty and Building Company located Bert Center,
had his default set aside (Rec. 69-80, 85), entered ao
appearance for him, and engineered an arrangement to
give defendant-respondent Center a fifth interest in the
ground, if the latter would go along with the defendant,
Alliance Realty and Building Company (Rec. 79, 102,
106, Ex. "C "). The cause proceeded to trial on docu-mentary evidence of title, and the respective depositions
of Dr. G. Murray Edwards (Rec. 86-89, Ex. "B"), and
Bert Center (Rec. 94-107). The Court, having heard
the evidence, indicated that if it believed the plaintiff's
case as exemplified by the testimony of Dr. Edward8,
it would be constrained to set aside the deed to Center,
and find for the pl,aintiff-appellant; but, instead of so
doing and deciding on the merits, ruled that plaintiff
had not produced enough evidence to sustain the burden
of proof, and gave judgment of dismissal in favor of
defendants (Rec. 109, 15-16). From this judgment and
decree, and the denial of a motion for a new trial, pl,aintiff-appellant prosecutes this appeal (Rec. 114.).
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ARGU~IENT

POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECIDE THE ISSUE OF FRAUD ON THE MERITS OF THE
CASE, RATHER THAN PREDICATING ITS DECISION ON
LACK OF BURDEN OF PROOF.

(A) The facts are clear, convincing, and decisive.

The facts in this case are not complicated. They
·are simple, direct, and convincing. It is clear that the
defendant Center obtained a deed in his favor (or in
blank, in which his name was later inserted) to enable
him to deal with the lots described as belonging to Dr.
Edwards. It is clear that no value was paid, or no other
consideration 'vas given to procure the delivery of the
deed-and, this is beyond all doubt definitely and decisively admitted by the defendant Center. It is clear
that Dr. Edwards would not have parted with his title,
except on reliance of the representations that defendant
Center might be able to turn a deal on the lots, remit
the purchase price, and earn a commission. It is clear
that a mutual relationship covering business, personal,
and medical matters had existed between the parties
over a period of years, and that there was a display of
confidence by each in the actions of the other. Dr. Edward's testimony is clear that he did not intend to make
a gift to Center of the ground, and, it is clear that no
monetary obligation existed on his part to Center. It
is clear that greater credence to the sale theory must be
given, in view of the fact that Center admitted he had
dealt in real estate in small way-undoubtedly the doeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tor was, in view of their friendly relationship endeavoring to give him some business. It is clear that Ce~ter
planned to leave Denver, although he apparently never
intended to come to Salt Lake City. Even after reco:r:ding
the deed to himself Center never manifested any interest
in the lots, never paid any taxes thereon, never entered
into possession-all that is clear. :Manifestly Center's
clain1 that the conveyance of the lots was the gift of the
doctor for past services, is the flimsiest sort of pretex
for claiming title. The testimony that the deed was a gift
for services gratuitously rendered in connection with
checking some oil leases or oil stock, and for which defendant Center never intended to charge, never rendered
a bill, never made any claim, but piously "hoped" for
something in return clearly fits in with the testimony
Inade on his own behalf that the doctor treated him
(Center) as 'a son, insofar as charging him in connection
with medical services rendered-makes it all too clear
and obvious that checking the items for the doctor was
only a favor for past favors, and, clearly not an enterprise of great moment for which compensation could
be garnered. It is all too clear that the doctor in giving
him an advantageous position in fixing medical feeswould not certainly feel obligated to compensate him
handsomely for a mere inquiry into the status of some
oil investments. The contention of Center that the lots
were given to him, for a prior transaction, is all too
clearly ,a mere plausible attempt to hold onto the lots,
and divide the value with the tax title claimant, Alliance
Realty and Building Company, with whom he has teamed
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up. It is clear, too, that Dr. Edwards without reference
to Center's violation of hi::; agreement, was clear and
positive about the transaction, and the details thereof,
and, the plaintiff here as his assignee stands in the same
relative and unin1peachable position. All of the physical
£acts, lack of interest by Center, non-payment of taxes,
non-user, non-concern about the lots, corroborate the
plaintiff's position. Certainly, if Center's claim was substantial as to these lots, he wouldn't have to concede
four-fifths of the interest to the defendant Alliance
Realty and Building Company, he could quiet the title
against the void tax deed in himself. The plaintiff's
evidence is clear, convincing, and decisive, and warranted
submission to the Court, sitting as a chancellor, of the
meritoriousness of his claim for rescission.
(B) The law on the quantum of proof to be supplied.

At the outset, we are confronted with the general
rule that parol evidence to vary the terms, conditions, or
purposes of a writing may not be introduced, in the
absence of a claim of fraud, mistake, or the like. The
Utah rule is in accord. See Fox Film Corp'n vs. Ogden
Theater Co., Inc., (1932) 17 Pacific 2nd, 294, 82 Utah
279, 90 A.L.R. 1299, where the court says at page 296
Pacific:
"(1) In the absence of fraud or mistake, a
conclusive rule to the effect that parol evidence
is not admissible to vary, add to, or subtract
from the terms of a valid written instrument is
generally applied in cases of this kind * * • ''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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See also, Starley vs. Deseret Foods Corp'n et al (1938)
74 Pacific 2nd 1221, 43 Utah 577, at page 1223 Pacific:
'' (1) In the absence of fraud, duress, or
oppression, parol evidence will not be received
to explain or modify an instrument, unless there
is something on the face thereof, or in the language or signature creating an ambiguity or
uncertainty * * * ".
Plaintiff here, is within the rule, since the contention is
that failure to follow out the agreement was premeditated, and immediate as shown by recording the deed
within four days after obtaining it, and therefore fraudulent.
True, the burden of proof is upon the party asserting the fraudulent conduct, and ordinarily it must be
proven by the preponderance of the evidence. See section 531 and 532, (page 730) .Abbott on Facts, 5th Edition
(Viesselman); 2 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, 2nd
Edition, Sections 546, 547, pages 1003-4; 24 .American
Jurisprudence, Fraud and Deceit, Sections 278, 279, and
this rule is well stated in the Utah case of Lane vs. Peterson (1926) 251 Pacific 374, 68 Utah 585, at page 379
Pacific:

'' * • * It is a well established rule of law that
fraud is never presumed, that when a transaction
is explainable upon the theory of honesty and
fair dealing that theory will be adopted, 'unless
the evidence clearly preponderates in favor of
the illegal aspect of the transaction' * • • ,
'the burden of. proving the alleged fraud must
be established by clear and convincing evidence'.
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Again, in Xelson v~. Leamington .Jl ines & Exploration Co., (1935) 48 Pacific 2nd 439, 87 Utah 69, at page
440 Pacific the court ~tates:
"(1) ~ * " ·in order to establish a charge of
this character, the complainant must show by
clear and decisive proof * '~ * '
However, despite the preponderance of the evidence
rule, there are a great Inany expressions, such as clear
preponderance, clear and convincing evidence, and the
like, as set out in Section 278, 24 American Jurisprudence, Title Fraud and Deceit, but, the variation in
language seems to be explainable upon grounds that,

" * * * perhaps the use of such descriptive
expressions in stating the required proof of
fraud in a civil case does no more than indicate
an approval of the proposition that fraud
cannot be founded upon doubtful, vague, uncertain, and inconclusive evidence, or upon mere
suspicion or conjecture * * * The use of such
expressions in every case has been attributed to
the fact that fraud must ordinarily be proved by
circumstantial evidence, and it has been suggested
that the variations in the expressions used by
the different courts indicate ,a view of what
constitutes a burden of evidence rather than
disagreement with the general rule that a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to establish fraud in a civil case * * * "-24 Am. J ur.,
Section 278, Fraud & Deceit.
(C) Enough evidence was produced to make an

issu,e and require submission to the Court
sitting as a chancellor.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
It has been stated (64 Corpus Juris 301, Section
317 (2), page 301)
"That the legal sufficiency of the evidence
to take the case to the jury (or the chancellor in
this case) is a question of law. * * * The question for the court is not whether there is literally
no evidence, but whether there is no evidence
which ought reasonably to satisfy the jury (or
chancellor) that the fact is established. In determining the question, the evidence as a whole
for the party having the burden of proof must
be looked to, and that construction of the evidence most favorable to the party introducing
it should be adopted with all reasonable inferences favorable to such party being drawn from
it * * * "
When the Court made its decision in this cause,
there was still before it (Rec. 90) defendants' motion
to dismiss. In determining the latter, which is similar
to a motion of non-suit, the following construction of
evidence should be taken :
'' (a) Assumption-The Court in passing upon the legal sufficiency of the evidence must assume the truth of the statements offered or made.
* * *
(c) Duty (1) It is the duty of the Court to
decide as a preliminary question (legal), whether
there is any evidence legally sufficient to be considered by the jury. * * *
(2) It is the duty of the trial
Court, giving to the evidence the most favorable
interpretation toward the party against whom
the motion is directed, to ·determine whether

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
there are any faet~ of the eYidence tending to
support plaintiff's right to recover.
(3) \Yhen the testimony is before
the Court, it i::; its duty to see that it has at
lea8t a natural tendency to sustain the allegations, and to warrant an inference of the fact
to be proved, and if there is no sufficient evidence to justify an inference of the disputed
fact, it should be withheld from the jury.''
Xote 94a to Section 317, 64 Corpus Juris, 301.
Construing the e\Tidence introduced in this cause
by the plaintiff, in the light of the above rules, c~r
tainly there is a sufficient showing, taking the plaintiff's testimony in the most favorable light, to support
his right of recovery, and he has sustained the burden
of the evidence. Such is the Utah rule :
'' (1) In determining the propriety of granting a motion for involuntary non-suit the evidence must be considered from a view most
favorable to the party against whom the dismissal is sought * * * " Page 432, Utah Reports,
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York vs. Middlemiss, 103 Utah 429, 135 Pac. 2nd 275, and
"(1) The question for determination in this
case is whether the trial court erred in granting
the motion for non-suit. To decide this question
we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. If plaintiff established
by sufficient competent evidence each of the
essential elements of his alleged cause of action
to make out a prima facie case of liability, the
court erred in non-suiting the plaintiff. If not
the judgment should be affirmed * * * '' - Page
510, Utah Reports, Oberg vs. Sanders (1947),
184 Pac. 2nd 229, 111 Utah 507.
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It is submitted, that viewed in this light, the Court
sitting as chancellor was required to pass on and decide on the preponderance of the evidence--a question
such as would go to the jury, or the court sitting
without a jury, or as chancellor, not as he did as a
preliminary question, but on the merits of the case.
Preponderance of the evidence as defined in Wilkinson vs. Anderson-Taylor Company, (1904), 79 Pac. 46
28 Utah 346 is:
''By preponderance of the evidence is meant
the greatest weight of the evidence, that which
is more convincing as to its truth. It is not
necessarily determined by the number of witnesses for or against a proposition, although
other things being equal it may be so determined '" * * ".
(D) The Court's Decision Af!irma1tively Shows

a Sufficiency of Evidence to Warrant a Decision on the Merits.

That the trial court sitting as a chancellor should
have considered the matter on the merits is clearly
shown from this statement in summation on page 108
of the record :
''The Court is of this view, that the testimony
of the plaintiff shows, if it is true, that the
man Center did not receive the property, did
not pay the taxes; that he has given up his interest; that there is an ;adverse interest, that he
has paid nothing for the property, except rendered a service for which he expected no pay;
it was not a legal obligation.
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••The Court is of the op1n1on that legally
that is not sufficient; and so, that there is
clear and convincing evidence that this deed
should be set aside and declared to be an instrument of agency.
"~ow the Court is ruling on this as a legal
matter; not on a question of fact; and if the
Court is in error, you can appeal it on that
ground; * * * ''
Certainly, if the Court on the assumption of the evidence as above could so hold, then, it had the manifest
duty of deciding the issue on the merits, not on the
ground of failure to sustain the burden of proof, or
insufficieny of the evidence to go to the Court or jury.
And, to hold to the theory that clear and convincing proof, or clear and precise proof, changes the
preponderance of the evidence rule, or requires the
compliance with the so-called numerical witness rule,
of at least two witnesses, would be to deny, in every
case, to parties who had advantage taken of them by
another, without benefit of witnesses, any relief whatsoever, no matter how great a fraud or imposition may
have been practiced or perpetrated upon them. That
such is not an absolute rule, see:
Pender vs. Cook (1930), 150 Atlantic 892, 300 Pennsylvania 468, where it is said, at page 894:
"(5-6) Parol evidence to change, affect, or
lessen the legal liability caused by the manner
in which the names are placed on commercial
paper can be considered only where fraud, accident, or mistake is shown, and must be of the
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same quality as that which would reform a
written instrument; that is, the evidence must
be clear, precise, and indubitable, established by
two witnesses, or by one witness and corroborating circumstamces."
and, again in Mitchell vs. First National Bank of Confluence (1939), 7 At1antic 2d, 511, 135 Pennsylvania
Superior 519, where the statement is made that it is
sufficient if:
'' ( 6-8) * * * resting upon the testimony of
one supported, as in this case, by corroborating
circumstances * * * ".
See VII Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Edition 259,
Section 2034 ( 2), that :
''In general, the testimony of a single witness no matter what the issue or who the person, may legally suffice as evidence on which
the jury may find a verdict.''
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CONCLUSION
It was error to leave the
remediless, and deprive him of
on the merib, on the weight
holding that he had failed to
carrying the evidence.

plaintiff and appellant
the fruits of a decision
of the evidence, by a
sustain the burden of

'VHEREFORE, plaintiff and appellant prays this
Honorable Court to reverse the holding of the trial
Court, and re1nand the same for further proceedings
in accordance "ith the principles contended for herein.
Respectfully submitted,

MILTON V. BACKMAN of
& CLARK,
.Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant

BACKMAN, BACKMAN
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